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Many studies have examined how children categorize various objects but few 
studies have looked at how children categorize race. Research shows that adults tend 
to essentialize race; that is, they treat race as a natural kind (Madole, Keleman, 
Glerum & Webb, 1999). Do children treat race in the same manner? This study 
examines how preschool children, second grade children, and fourth grade children 
treat race. Children were presented with stories and pictures describing a 
transformation to a person's racial characteristics (that is, a change in external 
appearance from white to black or black to white features) and asked to what category 
the person belonged after the changes. To examine whether children treat race more 
like a biological change or an artifact change, similar stories described changes to 
animals and to artifacts. It was hypothesized that the development of essentialization 
is related to an acquired knowledge of inheritance. Results showed that 
essentialization of racial categories follows a developmental progression in which 
preschool children do not essentialize race, some second grade students have started 
to essentialize race, and a greater number of fourth graders essentialize race. The 
introduction of inheritance did not significantly affect children's essentialization of 
race. Overall, some hypotheses were confirmed, others were disconfirmed, and some 
unexpected results were found. 
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I. Introduction 
The ability to categorize is a fundamental process of human cognition, and is 
therefore one of the foremost areas of research for psychologists. Without the ability 
to categorize, the world would be overwhelmingly complex. Imagine the need to 
respond differently to every object encountered instead of being able to recognize 
exemplars of categories that encompass a wide range of known and novel objects. If 
every person, every object, every event, and every experience needed to be identified 
and dealt with as individual instances instead of representations of categories, the 
world would be incomprehensible. Categorization allows us to order and simplify 
our world by reducing the complexity to a manageable and efficient system of 
categories and sub-categories and by allowing us to make inductive inferences about 
objects that we encounter (Gelman, 1988). For example, there are many chairs in our 
world, but we do not treat each kind of chair as a new object. Instead, when people 
encounter a chair in their environment it is usually quickly recognized and mentally 
pigeonholed into the "chair" category. Adults seem to recognize certain features 
shared by exemplars of the chair category and are able to induce the object's category 
membership. 
Nominal Kinds, Natural Kinds, and Artifacts 
Objects in our world can be broken into three distinct conceptual representations, 
or kinds of categories: nominal kinds, artifacts, and natural kinds. Schwartz (1979) 
defines a nominal kind as ". . . any term which gathers its extension not by an 
underlying trait but by a list of semantically associated descriptive properties (p. 
310)." Schwartz proposes that nominal kinds are defined by a list of necessary and 
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sufficient characteristics. For an example, an uncle may have many features (a beard, 
a jovial disposition, a habit of giving terrible gifts), but these features are only 
characteristic of some uncles, none of these is necessary for a person to fit the 
definition of an uncle, nor are they sufficient to define the concept of uncle. The 
necessary characteristics are that (a) the person is male, and (b) that he is the sibling 
of a child's parent; without these two characteristics, the person is not an "uncle." 
These two characteristics combined are also sufficient; that is, only these two facts 
need to be present for a person to be an uncle. 
In this paper, I am primarily concerned with the next two kinds of categories: 
artifacts and natural kinds. Artifacts are created objects that depend upon function for 
their identity (Keil, 1989); that is, artifacts are defined by how they are used, their 
characteristic actions, or the intended purpose of the creator (Madole, 1993; Nelson, 
1979; Richards, Goldfarb, Richards, & Hassen, 1989). When the function of an 
artifact changes, adults will treat the artifact as a member of a different category. An 
example of an artifact is a coffeepot. As long as it is used to make or hold coffee, we 
believe that it is, in fact, a coffeepot. However, if we make some simple changes to 
the object (e.g., fill it with birdseed and hang it somewhere accessible to birds), it can 
become a birdfeeder. When changes are made to the function of an artifact the 
artifact may change categories. 
Schwartz (1979) defines "natural kind" more precisely as any term that derives its 
meaning only from an underlying trait (that is, its "essence"). Examples of natural 
kinds are those things that occur naturally in the world around us (ergo, "natural" 
kinds), such as animals and plants. We may not know for sure what makes a cat a 
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cat, but there is an underlying property or trait that gives the cat its "catness." 
Essentialist Thinking About Natural Kinds 
Philosophers tend to debate the existence of essences. For psychologists, 
however, (e.g., Medin and Ortony) the actual existence of essences is less important 
than people's beliefs in the existence of essences. Psychological essentialism refers to 
the idea that people form representations of objects that include the belief (correct or 
incorrect) that some objects (i.e., natural kinds) have internal, perhaps unknown, 
essences that make the objects what they are. These essences may or may not 
actually exist, but the belief that they exist is important in forming representations of 
objects (Medin & Ortony, 1989). In other words, people treat natural kinds as if they 
believe that these kinds of objects have "essences" that are not always immediately 
discernable, something that goes beyond what is superficially apparent (Keil, 1989). 
We define the instance of a natural kind according to this presumed essence. Keil 
(1989) adds that people tend to treat natural kinds in ways that preserve their kind 
across superficial transformations; that is, people believe natural kinds resist changes 
in category membership, even if the entity's appearance changes dramatically. 
Psychological essentialism is an important concept in understanding category 
formation. A commonly used paradigm for studying essentialist thinking is to present 
participants with brief stories that describe a change in the appearance of an object so 
that it has all of the superficial characteristics of another object (e.g., a raccoon 
changed in appearance to resemble a skunk). Stories are accompanied by "before" 
and "after" pictures. Participants are then asked whether the object is still an instance 
of the original category, or now an instance of the "new" category (e.g., "Is this 
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animal now a skunk or is it still a raccoon?"). Essentialist thinking is reflected in a 
tendency to deny that the object has changed its category membership. Results of 
studies using this method (e.g., Keil, 1989) have shown that people tend to 
essentialize natural categories (e.g., humans and birds), but not artifact categories 
(e.g., coffeepots and bird feeders). 
Adults tend to categorize natural kinds based upon presumed essences; do children 
as well? The answer to that question is embedded within the larger question of how 
children develop categories. One current, major debate in the area of category 
development concerns the roles of perceptual and conceptual features. Perceptual 
features are those things that we derive from sensory experiences, for example, seeing 
that a bird has a beak, hearing that a bird sings, or feeling that a bird has soft feathers. 
Conceptual features, on the other hand, refer to the representations that we form of 
our environment — that is, to more abstract relationships and non-visible features. 
For example, a toy poodle and a bullmastiff are both dogs despite glaring perceptual 
differences. Two basic differing opinions exist in the current literature. One position 
maintains that humans have the ability to form conceptual categories from infancy, 
and that categorization occurs at a conceptual level from early in life (Hirschfeld, 
1994, 1995; Mandler, 1993). The other view maintains that the formation of 
categories is a process of gathering perceptual information that evolves into concepts 
as more and more information becomes available (Madole & Oakes, 1999). 
Some psychologists postulate that the developmental changes from perceptually-
based representations to conceptually-based representations are more a qualitative 
shift than a quantitative shift (Hirschfeld, 1994; Keil, 1989; Mandler, 1993). This 
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position divides conceptualization and perception into dichotomous processes, which 
either do not overlap (Keil, 1991) or that are mediated by a complex process of 
redescription that Mandler (1993) calls "perceptual analysis." According to Mandler, 
"perceptual analysis" is a process that transforms the rudimentary perceptual patterns 
that stem from the sensory information available to infants and children into a more 
sophisticated conceptual format. Mandler claims that concepts have " . . . a non-
perceptual core. . . (p. 142)", which leads to the bemusing conclusion that concepts 
must then spring from other concepts. This perspective de-emphasizes the role of 
perception in conceptual category formation, holding that infants have an a priori 
ability to form concepts without relying solely upon perceptual — a classic case of 
which comes first, the chicken, or the egg. 
Other psychologists argue that the shift from perceptual discrimination to 
conceptual theorization is based upon the increasing quantity of knowledge available 
to the developing child, rather than a qualitative structural shift (Jones & Smith, 1993; 
Madole & Oakes, 1999; Springer, 1996). The developing child, according to this 
viewpoint, is expert at the induction of correlations based upon available and repeated 
perceptual cues. The child develops conceptual theories through observations of 
increasingly complex correlations. Madole and Oakes (1999) argue that ". . . one of 
the most critical aspects of developmental change in infants' categorization is their 
increasing attention to abstract features of objects and their recognition of the 
relationship between abstract features and perceptual features (p. 272)." To illustrate, 
imagine a child who notices that an object called "bird" has a beak, has feathers, and 
can fly. Every time something that is called "bird" appears, the child takes note that 
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it, too, has a beak, has feathers and can fly. Soon the child begins to form a concept 
of "bird - an object that has a beak, has feathers, and can fly." As this child develops, 
she attends not only to perceptual features of the category "bird"(e.g., can fly, has a 
beak, has feathers, etc.) but also to abstract features (e.g., has common organs, 
migrates, has bird genetics, etc.). Over time, the child perceives more details 
regarding this concept of "bird," the amount of knowledge available to the child 
grows, and the concept of bird becomes more complex and theory-like. The child 
formulates a concept of bird "essence", which includes some internal criterion of 
"birdness" that allows a robin, a parrot, an ostrich, and a penguin to each fall into that 
category despite perceptual differences. This process involves a shift from 
perceptually based inference to conceptually based inference - as more information 
becomes available to the child. 
Children and Essentialist Beliefs 
Children seem to show some belief in the existence of essential properties. A study 
by Gelman and Markman (1987) suggests that even 3 year-old children have 
knowledge that natural kind category membership includes more than superficial 
features, and that category membership is more relevant to children's inferences than 
are perceptual features. In other words, even children as young as 3 years old 
essentialize natural kind categories to an extent. Similarly, Keil (1989) conducted a 
study in which a transformation to an artifact or a natural object was described. For 
example, doctors change various aspects of a raccoon (e.g., paint a stripe on it, add an 
odor gland) and show before and after pictures (raccoon and skunk). Children were 
then questioned as to which category they believed the animal belongs. Artifact 
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examples were presented in the same manner. Keil found that, when presented with 
stories in which a raccoon is surgically transformed so that it has the appearance of a 
skunk, children as young as 7 years of age will deny that the animal is now a skunk 
(Keil, 1989). 
The fact that children essentialize many natural kind categories does not 
automatically indicate that even young children are using only conceptual thinking. 
Treating perception and conception as inextricably locked in a reciprocal relationship 
is logically more palatable than treating them as separate entities. Even adults make 
mistakes that indicate the interactive nature of conception and perception. For 
example, adults make conceptual mistakes based upon perceptual information (e.g., a 
dolphin as a fish rather than a mammal, a tomato as a vegetable rather than a fruit, 
etc.) but will modify their conceptualizations based upon discovered information. 
This new information, in turn, will modify perceptions (e.g., we now inescapably see 
that, indeed, the dolphin has a blowhole for breathing air like a mammal rather than 
gills to breathe as a fish). This type of "initial mistake + new information = 
modification" relationship strongly suggests an interaction between perceptual and 
conceptual processing that is mediated by the available quantity or quality of 
information. 
Children, Race, and Essentialism 
While a large literature exists on the development of object categorization 
(Mandler, 1993; Younger, 1993; also see Keil, 1989 and Madole & Oakes, 1999 for 
reviews), there has been little research examining children's development of racial 
categorization (Madole & Oakes, 1999). Racial categories are familiar to all of us, 
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yet the manner in which those categories are formed is relatively unknown (Madole et 
al., 1999). Do children go through developmental stages in their formation of racial 
categories? Of the studies that have examined this question, few give concrete 
information about the process of children's acquisition of adult-like racial 
categorization. 
How do children categorize race? The answer to that question varies according to 
different research. In a series of studies, Hirschfeld (1995) finds support for his belief 
that children have an adult-like theory of race from a very young age — that is, that 
even very young children essentialize race. His work seems to support the claim that 
children as young as three years of age believe that a person's race is unalterable but, 
interestingly, that their bodies are not. He reports that "By 4 years of age children 
believe that race is fixed by birth, expecting the inheritance of racial features to be 
mediated by biological reproduction. In short, preschoolers demonstrate a 
biologically grounded understanding of race (p. 240)." 
Hirschfeld's work consistently finds evidence for a precocious understanding of 
race and biology. His methodology, however, leads to questions as to what the 
findings truly indicate regarding race and biology. For example, in a series of studies 
exploring the development of racial conceptualization, Hirschfeld (1995) uses 
drawings of figures as stimuli to depict several changes in a person's appearance. 
Examining previous research, Hirschfeld discusses that a drawback in previous 
studies was that the kinds of properties that were being manipulated, skin color for 
example, were familiar to children, but the actual transformations presented were 
outside children's realm of experience; that is, children never see a person of 
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Caucasian appearance change into a person of African-American appearance. Says 
Hirschfeld: "Previous work may thus underestimate young children's knowledge of 
identity constancy because subjects have been asked to reason about personal identity 
in the face of unfamiliar changes in a person's appearance" (pp. 218-219). Yet, 
saying that, he then immediately describes a study of his own in which the stimuli 
used lack realism. The kind of human transformations presented are within children's 
experience, but other transformations that he used are not; a normal car transformed 
into a "fat" car is not something with which children are familiar. Madole and Oakes 
(1999) present a summary of literature demonstrating that the realism of a given 
stimulus directly affects the responses given by children. It is questionable whether 
Hirschfeld's stimuli are realistic enough to elicit responses representative of 
children's understanding and actual knowledge applied to people and objects in their 
environment. 
In contrast to Hirschfeld, others researchers cite evidence in support of a gradual 
development of racial categories and believe that young children respond purely to 
perceptual cues of race rather than an underlying knowledge of genetics and an adult-
like essentialization (Aboud, 1988; Semaj, 1980). Semaj (1980) reports results from 
a study that probed race constancy in African-American children. The findings 
suggest that mastery of racial constancy does not occur until sometime after age 11 
(the oldest sample in the study). Semaj reports that only 40% of the 10-11 year-old 
children in the study maintained racial constancy when the stimulus' skin and hair 
color were altered. In other words, children as old as 11 did not essentialize race 
reliably. However, Madole et al. (1999) report that nearly all adults believed that, 
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despite changes in appearance, the stimulus person's race had not changed. 
In the Madole et al. 1999 study, adults were presented with a packet containing 
various stories that described permanent changes to a person's gender, a person's 
race, a person's hair length, an animal's species, or an object's appearance and 
function. The stories were accompanied by pictures to illustrate the changes 
described. The results obtained by this study indicate that adults tend to think of race 
as a natural kind, that is, immutable and essential to identity (Madole et al., 1999). In 
fact, adults were more likely to indicate that a person could change their gender than 
change racial categories! 
Do children tend to view race as belonging to a category other than natural kinds? 
That is, are they willing to say that an individual can change race by changing 
appearance? Somewhere along the way, children learn that race is more than the 
perception of skin color and begin to form a theory; they begin to conceptualize race. 
At what point, however, do they begin to make that transition? I think that it has to 
do, at least in part, with a child's developing understanding that race is genetically 
based. Clark, Hocevar, and Dembo (1980) found support for the hypothesis that 
children's explanations of skin color go through a predictable developmental 
sequence, ranging from supernaturalism (God made them that way) to physicalism 
(genetic causes). They also found support for the hypothesis that developmental 
prerequisites for an adult theory-like understanding of the origins of skin color 
include understanding physical conservation, understanding that phenomena have 
physical causes, and understanding that one's identity does not change with age. 
These comprehension levels match with a developing understanding of inheritance. 
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Many researchers have demonstrated that race constancy develops somewhat later 
than gender constancy, but tends to correlate with the same Piagetian stages gender 
constancy does (Aboud, 1983; Bern, 1989; Clark et al., 1980; Semaj, 1980). In a 
study examining children's perceptions of ethnic constancy, Aboud (1983) found 
evidence that suggests that children do not acquire a consistent or confident 
knowledge of ethnic constancy before age 8. She also found two other cognitive 
abilities that correlated with the development of ethnic constancy: ethnic permanence 
(knowledge of the unchangeable nature of ethnicity), and conservation. 
Alejandro-Wright (1985) points out that many researchers define a child's ability 
to apply racial terms as an ability to classify racially. However, she makes the case 
that the ability to apply racial terms falls short of true racial classification in that this 
task only requires identification ("give me the white/black/etc. dolly) not actual 
classification (grouping similar things). She used a series of interviews in which 
children were given a spontaneous classification task, a structured classification task, 
and a probing task. She demonstrated that younger children (two groups in her study: 
3-4 year olds and 5-6 year olds) show a tendency to spontaneously group people 
using criteria other than race or skin color. Even when older children (8-10 years of 
age) begin to spontaneously categorize by racial category, they show a tendency to 
use labels other than the socialized adult labels. 
So, what exactly is it that triggers a developmental understanding of race? In light 
of the studies suggesting that race constancy and gender constancy are 
developmentally correlated (Aboud, 1983; Bern, 1989; Clark et al., 1990; Semaj, 
1980), it makes sense to take a brief look at gender constancy for clues as to what 
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type of information may contribute to race constancy. Bern (1989) discusses 
previous measures of gender constancy and demonstrates that the traditional methods 
are subject to misinterpretation; they fail to truly test gender conservation across 
perceptual transformation, or are artificial. The previous studies do not address any 
underlying biological knowledge that children may have regarding what makes 
someone in "essence" a boy or a girl. She developed a new measure for gender 
constancy in a study that involved children's knowledge of genitalia as a measure for 
gender constancy. Her results indicate that gender constancy is not so much purely a 
developmental stage (as previous researchers believed) as it is a simple matter of (a) a 
knowledge of genital differences in boys and girls and (b) the knowledge that genital 
cues are more important than social cues for gender identity. This combination of 
knowledge, specific to the domain of sexual identity, is the crucial piece for 
development of gender constancy. 
What, then, is the domain-specific piece of knowledge that leads to the 
development of race constancy? I hypothesize that children's knowledge of 
inheritance will play an important role. Studies indicate that even preschool aged 
children have biological knowledge of inheritance (Springer & Keil, 1989) and 
distinguish between biological and social domains (Springer, 1992). The second 
point is consistent with Bern's (1989) findings that children need not only to be aware 
of biological genital differences but, importantly, must also understand that biological 
domains take precedence over social domains. Springer (1992) also reports that 
children will base their inductions upon physical similarity when no information 
regarding kinship is given. When kinship is introduced, they judge it as more 
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relevant than physical similarity, and will preferentially base their inductions upon 
kinship. In addition, he indicates that social relationship is not considered as salient 
for children as is kinship. 
Do young children automatically view race as an immutable, essential component 
of identity, or do they gradually develop a preference for essentializing race? More 
specifically, do children have an innate tendency to essentialize race or is it 
something that is developed as they gain experience and knowledge of the world? 
Based upon the research by Bern (1989), Spring (1992), and Springer and Keil 
(1989), I hypothesize several possible findings: first, if children view race as a 
biological concept (a natural kind), and they also understand the concept of 
inheritance, they will be more likely to essentialize it when presented with inheritance 
information. If children view race as only a social concept, they will less likely 
believe it is inheritable, and by extension, less likely to essentialize it. Second, if 
children understand inheritance, then the physical similarities or differences of 
socially related individuals will have less impact than the physical similarities or 
differences of biologically related individuals. Thus if children are presented with a 
change in racial appearance and in addition are presented with information relating to 
inheritance (e.g., pictures of parents) they will be more likely to hold views of race 
constancy. Third, as children age, they will increasingly view race as a biological 
concept and begin to comprehend inheritance and its impact on natural kind 
transformations. These increasing awarenesses will impact their theories of racial 
categorization, which will look more and more adult-like with increasing age. 
The study proposed here is an extension of one designed and implemented by 
Madole et al. (1999), which explored the conditions under which adults essentialize 
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the social categories of race and sex. Madole points out that little attention has been 
devoted to examining adult essentialist beliefs regarding social categories. This study 
will examine the conditions under which children essentialize the social category of 
race, essentially replicating the Madole et al., (1999) study with children. Children 
were presented with modifications of stories used by Madole, excluding those 
describing sex transformations. The criterion stories and pictures described a racial 
appearance change (black to white or white to black), and children were asked to 
identify the person's post-change category membership. 
II. Method 
Participants 
Students from preschools and elementary schools in the Bowling Green, Kentucky 
vicinity participated in the study. The first age group, twenty three- and four-year-
olds, were recruited from a Montessori preschool. The second age group, eighteen 
seven- and eight-year-olds (roughly second grade, some from the first grade), and the 
third age group, eighteen nine- and ten-year-olds (roughly fourth grade, some from 
the third grade) were recruited from a public elementary school. We contacted the 
local school board for permission to conduct the study within the school system. One 
elementary school principal volunteered to allow the research to be conducted in her 
school. Teachers were contacted for permission to conduct the study within specific 
classrooms. Permission to conduct research at the preschool was obtained from the 
director. Parents of the students were contacted through a letter sent home with the 
children (see Appendix B). The letter emphasized that participation was voluntary 
and that children would receive a small token (a Western Kentucky University pencil) 
for returning the consent forms. The token was presented for the return of the form 
and was not contingent upon willingness to participate. Students at each age level, 
with parental consent to participate, were randomly selected and assigned to one of 
the two conditions, counterbalanced for gender. All procedures were approved by the 
Human Subjects Review Board of Western Kentucky University. 
Stimuli 
The interviewer presented stories adapted from Madole et al. (1999) to 
communicate various changes to an object, animal, or person at a level accessible to 
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children. Race change stories presented a scenario that introduced a person of either 
white or black appearance. The person was described as looking and acting like 
"most black/white boys/girls" while growing up, after which a picture of the person 
was presented. Another picture, supposedly of the person's natural parents or 
neighbors (depending on condition) was also presented. Next, a visit to the doctor 
was described, during which the doctor changed the appearance of the person to 
resemble the picture of the other ethnicity (black/white). A new picture, presumably 
of the same person after the doctor's visit, was presented for the child. The child was 
then asked what he/she thought the person now was, "still a black/white person, or are 
they now a white/black person"? The response was recorded and follow up questions 
were asked regarding the race of this person's potential offspring. A similar pattern 
was followed for the artifact changes and for the hair length changes, with minor 
changes to accommodate the differences in storyline. Examples of the stories and 
accompanying pictures can be seen in Appendix A. 
Stories were accompanied by "before" and "after" photographs, as well as pairs of 
"parent" or "neighbor" photographs (depending on condition) that reflected the pre-
transformation race, species, or artifact stimuli. Picture stimuli were obtained from 
several current on-line fashion magazines, animal-oriented websites, and from 
commercially available morphing software (e.g., Kai's Super Goo). The photographs 
were manipulated using Adobe Photoshop 5.0. The pictures were then printed in 
black and white on glossy photo-quality paper with an ink-jet printer. The pictures 
were cut into 4 by 5 cards and laminated for durability. Examples of the stimuli can 
be seen in Appendix A. 
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Design and Procedure 
Children were interviewed at their respective schools. Data was collected from 
each child in a single, 10-15 minute individual interview. Interviews were scheduled 
at the discretion of the children's classroom teachers. Each child was told that his or 
her parents had given permission for the child to participate in what we were doing. 
They were told, in age-appropriate language, that they did not have to participate if 
they did not want to, and could quit at anytime without penalty. After the child 
indicated assent (orally for the youngest children, via signature for older children) the 
experimenter read a brief set of instructions telling the child that some of the 
questions "will seem unusual, but that [you] should answer as best that [you] can and 
that there is no right' answer." 
Sessions were conducted in vacant classrooms or other available places within the 
schools, depending upon changing availability. Children were seated across a desk or 
table from the examiner. Each session was tape-recorded for later transcription. 
The examiner read seven short stories involving a change in appearance of an animal, 
an object, or a person. Four of the stories read to the children involved a change in 
the physical characteristics that specify an individual's race, and three were control 
stories. The gender of the Stimulus person (Stimulus Gender) and direction of race 
change (Direction of change) were within subjects variables: each child received one 
set of stories and pictures demonstrating a black male changing in appearance to a 
white male, a white male changing in appearance to a black male, a black female 
changing in appearance to a white female and a white female changing in appearance 
to a black female. 
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One-half of the participants were randomly assigned to the Inheritance condition 
and the remaining half were assigned to the Non-inheritance condition. In the 
Inheritance condition, the participants received race change stories that indicated 
inheritance by displaying a male and female pair of the same initial racial appearance 
as the Stimulus person. This pair was described as parents of the Stimulus person 
(Stimulus Parents). In the Non-inheritance condition, participants received stories 
that displayed a male and female pair of the same initial racial appearance who were 
described as neighbors of the stimulus person (Stimulus Neighbors). 
All participants received the same three control stories. One story described 
artifact changes (coffeepot to bird feeder) with the manipulation of 
"Inheritance"(made in same factory) for one half of the participants, and "Non-
inheritance" (made in different factories) for the other half. One story described 
animal changes (squirrel to rabbit), with inheritance split between the two conditions, 
and one described hairstyle changes (long hair to short hair), again with an 
inheritance split between conditions. Each story was accompanied by a "before" 
transformation and an "after" transformation picture as well as pictures of "parents" 
and "neighbors." 
The stories were presented in two different, semi-random orders. The order was 
arranged so that no more than two race change stories were presented in sequence; the 
artifact, animal, and hair change stories were used to divide up the race change 
stories. The order was counterbalanced within age and child's gender. 
Following each story, participants were asked to verbally indicate the stimulus' 
category membership (for example, is this person still a black person, or is he now a 
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white person?). Participants' responses were marked on an answer sheet and were 
also recorded with an audio tape recorder. To further probe the inheritance aspect, 
follow-up questions were asked regarding the category membership of the stimulus' 
offspring (e.g., "If 'Sally' had babies, what would her babies be? Would they be 
white babies or would they be black babies?"). The independent variable of the two 
different questions asked, whether the target stimulus changed, and whether the 
offspring have changed, will be henceforth referred to as Question. After all stories 
were read, children were probed for more information about what they believe makes 
someone the race that they are, why they can or cannot change, and why their 
children do or do not change. 
Participants were debriefed at an age-appropriate level and any questions that they 
had were answered. As a precaution, children were assured in debriefing that this 
kind of change does not actually happen, even by mistake, and that the questions we 
asked were just to discover what children would think if it could have happened. 
III. Results 
The presentation of each story was followed by a question for which one of two 
answers was possible: change of category membership or no change of category 
membership. Each child was given a score of 1 for each response that indicated a 
change in category membership, and assigned a score of 0 for each response that 
indicated retention of category membership. Lower scores would indicate greater 
essentializing of the category. 
The first analysis examined children's responses to the race change questions. I 
did not believe that Stimulus Gender would have a significant effect on the answers 
that the children gave. To assess whether Stimulus Gender had a significant impact 
on the children's answers, scores were summed across direction of change resulting 
in a score from 0 (no change) to 2 (both stimuli changed). I then used a two-tailed, 
paired t-test to examine children's responses when the stimulus was a woman versus 
when the stimulus was a man. Children showed no difference in responses to the 
stimulus change questions when the stimuli were female (M = 1.57) than when the 
stimuli were male (M = 1.60), r(59) = .63, p = .53. As well, there were no significant 
differences in responses to the offspring question when the stimulus was female (M = 
1.32) than when the stimulus was male (AT = 1.38), t{59) = 1.07, p = .29. Therefore, I 
collapsed across Stimulus Gender: female black to white race change and male black 
to white race change form a single response, and female white to black race change 
and male white to black race change form the second response. Therefore, each 
child's scores could range from 0 to 2 for changes to the stimulus person, and 0 to 2 
for changes to the offspring. 
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I also postulated that Order would not affect the answers that children gave. I used 
a two-tailed t-test to examine the effects of Order. Order 1 scores were marginally 
higher (M = 3.5) than Order 2 scores (AT = 2.79), t(59) = 1.88, p = .06. Therefore, 
Order was included in the analyses. 
A major hypothesis was a main effect of Age. I hypothesized that older children 
would have lower scores than would younger children, indicating that older children 
were less likely to accept a transformation than were younger children. A second 
hypothesis was an Age x Inheritance Condition interaction; I believed that the 
introduction of inheritance information would be more likely to lower older 
children's scores than younger children's scores. Third, I predicted a main effect of 
Direction of Change, with children being more likely to accept a race change in the 
direction of the majority (that is, from black to white). Lastly, an Age x Question x 
Inheritance interaction was hypothesized. I hypothesized that older children would be 
more likely to treat the racial category of a stimulus' offspring as a natural kind when 
inheritance was emphasized than would younger children or children for whom 
inheritance was not emphasized. In order to evaluate these hypotheses, scores were 
entered into a 3 (age group) x 2 (inheritance condition) x 2 (direction of change) x 2 
(question) x 2 (order) repeated measures ANOVA. Age group, inheritance condition, 
and order were between subject variables. Question and direction of change were 
repeated measures. 
This analysis resulted in a main effect of Age, F(2, 48) = 10.19, p < .01. 
Preschool children (M = 1.67) were more likely to say that a stimulus changed racial 
category than were 4lh grade children (M = 1.03), F( l , 48) = 17.13,p < .01. Likewise, 
2nd grade children (M = 1.64) were more likely to say that a stimulus changed racial 
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category than were 4lh graders, F(l , 48) = 13.93, p < .01. . Preschool children did not 
differ significantly from 2nd grade children, F( l , 48) = .023, p = .88. 
This analysis also revealed a main effect of Question, F( l , 48) = 6.57, p < .05. 
Change scores were higher for the target stimuli (M = 1.58) than for the offspring of 
the target stimuli (M = 1.35). 
The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of Order, F( l , 48) = 15.71, p < .01. 
Children who received order 1 (M = 1.71) were more likely to report that a stimulus 
changed racial categories than children who received order 2 (M = 1.19). An Age x 
Order interaction was also found (table 1), F(2, 48) = 3.73, p < .05. Single degree of 
Figure 1. Age x Order Interaction 
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freedom contrasts revealed that preschoolers who received order 1 (A/ = 1.75) did not 
differ in their scores than did preschoolers who received order 2 (M = 1.57), F( l , 48) 
= .008, p = .93. Second graders who received order 1 (A/ = 1.8) did not differ 
significantly in their answers than did 2nd graders who received order 2 (M = 1.44), 
F( 1, 48) = .48, p =.49. However, 4lh graders who received order 1 (M = 1.56) 
obtained higher change scores than 4'h graders who received order 2 (M = .5), F( l , 48) 
= 18.37,/? = .93. 
The Condition x Order interaction was also significant, F( l , 48) = 6.75, p = .014. 
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Single degree of freedom contrasts revealed that children in the inheritance condition, 
order 1 (M = 1.94) had higher change scores than children in the inheritance 
condition, order 2 (M - 1.1), F( l , 48) = 21.45, p < .05. However, children in the 
noninheritance condition, order 1 (M = 1.45) did not differ from the children in the 
noninheritance condition, order 2 (M = 1.27), F(l , 48) = .936,p = .34. 
Finally, there was a Question x Direction x Inheritance Condition interaction, F( l , 
48) = 4.2, p < .05. To simplify this analysis I ran a separate analysis for each 
Question type; one analysis for the target stimuli, and one analysis for the offspring of 
the target stimuli. Analysis of the target stimuli scores did not reveal effects of 
condition or direction, but did reveal a marginal Direction x Condition interaction, 
F(l , 58) = 3.73, p = .06. Children's response scores for the target stimuli in the white 
to black, inheritance condition (M = 1.67) were higher than for the black to white, 
inheritance condition (M = 1.6). Children's response scores for the white to black, 
noninheritance condition (M = 1.47) were lower than for the black to white, 
noninheritance condition (M = 1.6), although none of these differences were 
significant. For the offspring question, there was a trend toward a Condition effect, 
F(l , 58) = 2.80, p < .10. Children in the inheritance condition (M = 1.52) had higher 
scores than children in the noninheritance condition (M = 1.18). This trend was in the 
opposite direction from what was expected. The analysis of the offspring question 
also revealed an effect of direction of change, F( l , 58) = 4.49, p = .05. As 
hypothesized, children had lower scores when the race change was from black to 
white (M - 1.25) than when the race change was from white to black (M = 1.45). 
There was not a Condition x Direction interaction for the offspring question. 
I predicted an overall Direction main effect, hypothesizing that children would be 
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more likely to accept a change in the direction of the majority (that is, black to white). 
While there is not a significant main effect of the direction of change, there is a trend 
in the direction expected, F( 1, 48) = 3.36, p = .07. Racial change from black to white 
(M = 1.53) resulted in marginally higher change scores than from white to black (M = 
1.41) 
I predicted that there would be an Age x Inheritance Condition interaction but 
analysis disconfirmed my hypothesis, F{ 1, 48) = .58, p = .56. As well, I predicted an 
Age x Inheritance Condition x Question interaction that was also disconfirmed, F{2, 
48) = .15, p = .86. 
The goal of the next set of analyses was to determine whether, overall, children 
viewed race more like a biological entity or like an artifact. To examine whether 
children viewed race more like a biological entity or like an artifact required the 
comparison of race stories with animal and artifact stories. I used chi square analyses 
to examine these categorical responses. As predicted, there was an increasing 
tendency to essentialize race as children's age increased. The initial analysis 
examined children's responses to see if the children treated changes to animals 
different than they treated changes to artifacts. Preschool students treated animals 
and artifacts similarly ,2(1) = .36, p = .55, Preschoolers, overwhelmingly responded 
that both animals and artifacts can change category membership. In other words, 
preschoolers failed to essentialize either category. Second grade students treated 
animals and artifacts as marginally different, with responses that indicated resistance 
to the idea that animals could change categories as easily as artifacts, *2( 1) = 3.27, p = 
.07. Fourth graders treated animals as significantly different from artifacts, ,2(1) = 
5.81,p < .05. Fourth grade responses clearly indicate that they are beginning to 
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essentialize animals as natural kinds, and therefore resist animal changes more than 
changes to artifacts (see Table 2). 
The second chi square analysis examined children's responses to see if they 
treated changes to race different than how they treated changes to animals. Preschool 
children, -2(1) = .03,p = .87, 2nd graders, *2(1) = .02,p = .89, and 4th graders, *2(1) = 
.77, p = .38 all treated racial categories as similar to animal categories. 
Lastly, a chi square analysis was used to examine how children treated race 
compared to how children treated artifacts. Preschool children treated race in the 
same way that they treated artifacts — that is, that both were equally likely to change, 
•
2(1) = .68, p = .41. Second grade children essentialize race more than they do 
artifacts, *2(1) = 3.8, p = .05, as do 4th grade children, »2(1) = 10.16,/? < .01. 
Table 2. Percentage of Children Essentializing (denying changes to category 
membership) 
Age Artifacts Animals Race 
Preschool 4.17% 8.33% 9.38% 
2nd Grade 0.00% 16.67% 18.06% 
4lh Grade 0.00% 27.78% 38.89% 
IV. Discussion 
The results of this study provide some evidence in support of my predictions, but 
they also revealed some unanticipated effects. I hypothesized that there would be a 
significant main effect of the age of the child. I expected that older children would 
have lower change scores than would younger children. This hypothesis was 
confirmed. Older children had significantly lower scores than did younger children, 
indicating that older children were more resistant to the idea that a person could 
change racial categories than were younger children. Fourth grade students were 
significantly more likely to deny that a person could change racial categories due to 
changes made by a doctor than were 2nd graders or preschool children. Preschool 
children and 2nd grade students did not differ in their responses. There appears to be a 
shift in thinking somewhere between 2nd grade and 4th grade that changes how 
children think about racial categorization with increasing essentializing of race. What 
is it that changes? 
I hypothesized that inheritance was the domain-specific piece of knowledge that 
children needed to develop an adult-like theory of race — that is, to treat race as a 
natural kind. I believed that if children received information describing race as a 
social concept (that is, the noninheritance condition) that they would be less likely to 
hold views of race constancy than would children who were presented with 
inheritance information (the inheritance condition). This prediction would have been 
confirmed by a significant main effect of inheritance condition. I also expected that 
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older children's responses would be influenced more by inheritance information than 
would younger children's scores; therefore, I also predicted an Age x Inheritance 
Condition interaction. Finally, I thought it was possible that children may accept 
transformations to the stimuli but deny transformations to the offspring of the stimuli. 
The photographic evidence of race changes might have influenced a child's decision 
about the stimulus person's racial change despite the child's knowledge of inheritance 
— that is, children's knowledge of inheritance may have been overridden by the visual 
evidence of the transformation to the stimulus person. However, the latent 
knowledge of inheritance may have resurfaced when children were then asked about 
the offspring of the stimulus person. The visual evidence of the transformation may 
have trumped children's knowledge of inheritance for that specific stimulus person, 
but without visual evidence of the offspring, the knowledge of inheritance could have 
caused children to predict that the offspring would remain the pre-transformation 
race. In other words, while the children may accept transformations to the stimulus 
because of the visual evidence, they may still reject transformations to the stimulus' 
children because of inheritance. Therefore, I predicted an Age x Inheritance 
Condition x Question interaction. However, contrary to my predictions, the 
introduction of inheritance did not have a significant impact on the responses that the 
children gave overall, nor did the predicted interactions emerge. Older children 
resisted changes to race more than did younger children, but inheritance did not 
appear to have any effect on their responses. 
There are several possibilities about why inheritance did not affect children's 
answers in this study. The first is that the children did not understand inheritance as it 
might affect changes to a person's race. A second possibility is that inheritance is not 
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relevant to children's treatment of racial categories and that the hypotheses I made 
were simply incorrect. Perhaps knowledge of inheritance is unimportant to children. 
However, contrary to both of these possibilities is Springer's (Springer & Keil, 1989; 
Springer, 1992) evidence that children do, in fact, have a knowledge of inheritance 
and that children place a higher priority on biological kinship than social relationship 
when that information is presented. This finding would suggest that children both 
understand the basic concept of inheritance and are influenced by inheritance 
information when it is presented. Springer's research was foundational to my 
hypothesis that children would respond differently to race when it was a social 
relationship than they would when it was a kinship, and that the understanding of 
inheritance would be key for a child beginning to essentialize race. Thus, an alternate 
explanation is that the operationalization of inheritance information in this study 
simply did not trigger children's knowledge of inheritance. The explanations of the 
"parent" pictures were brief, and merely describing the people in the picture as 
"parents" may have been insufficient to trigger the concept of inheritance, or the 
mention of kinship or social information was unnoticed by the child. Perhaps the 
novelty of the storyline presented and the possibility of a person changing their skin 
color may have been so fascinating to children that it occupied their full attention and 
the subtlety of the inheritance information was lost. As well, unlike Springer (1992), 
I did not present the same children with both conditions of social relationship and 
conditions of kinship. The presentation of both types of relationships sets the two in 
contrast to each other and may force the child to make a choice about which to 
emphasize. In this study, however, children were presented with only one condition 
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or the other and the forced prioritizing of the inheritance versus noninheritance 
information did not take place. Follow up studies could look at inheritance condition 
as a repeated measure rather than as a between subjects variable. Information could 
then be obtained about how individual children treat race when it is presented as a 
social concept versus when it is presented as a kinship concept. Perhaps when 
children are presented with both scenarios it will cause them to think differently about 
how the racial identities and the relationships of the parents or the neighbors may 
affect the possibility of the stimulus changing. As mentioned previously, it could also 
have been that visual evidence of the transformations overpowered children's 
knowledge of inheritance, presenting a more compelling reason to accept 
transformations. Future studies could examine the same issues without using pictures 
as evidence to provide a more accurate measure of how the knowledge of inheritance 
factors into children's decisions by removing evidence that could override their 
knowledge and cause their responses to change. Another important consideration for 
future research is the presence or absence of inheritance knowledge. In this study, I 
did not actually examine each child's level of understanding for inheritance. Future 
research could screen to check children's understanding or lack of understanding of 
inheritance and compare children's responses directly to their level of inheritance 
knowledge. 
Order turned out to be a main effect that was not predicted. Similarly, Age x 
Order and Inheritance Condition x Order interactions were not expected. 
Examination of the orders that were used present few obvious clues as to why order 
should matter (see Appendix C). One possibility is related to the fact that the animal 
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change story was presented first in Order 1, but the artifact change story was 
presented first in Order 2. For the 4th grade students, having the object stimuli first 
(order 2) may have cued them about what kinds of answers were expected. They 
knew that a coffeepot could easily become a birdfeeder, but were sophisticated 
enough to realize that changes to people were not quite as simple as changes to 
objects and put more thought into their answers. This cueing may help to explain the 
Age x Order effects. The younger students were not yet sophisticated enough to 
understand the object transformations as different than transformations to people, but 
the older students did. The possibility of a cueing effect for older children could be 
explored more fully by specifically manipulating where object transformations are 
placed in the order of stimuli to see if the object transformations affected responses 
after their introduction. In this study, object transformations were either at the very 
beginning or at the very end of the orders, so no further exploration of this possibility 
is available. In my opinion it is more likely that, because of the small sample size (9 
for each order in each age group), the 4th grade, order 2 group randomly happened to 
have two or three precocious students who had already fully developed an adult-like 
theory of race. Thus, the inadvertent grouping of these students in the same order 
variable created the effects revealed in the analysis. In future research, larger sample 
sizes could minimize this effect. 
Another hypothesis that needs to be considered is Direction of Change (whether 
the stimulus was changing from black to white or white to black). I hypothesized that 
children would be more likely to accept racial change in the direction of the majority. 
There was a trend revealed in the direction expected. Children were more likely to 
accept racial change from black to white than from white to black. The likely 
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explanation for this effect is in-group bias. Nearly all of the children in the study 
were Caucasian; therefore, in-group bias would suggest that children would be more 
likely to accept changes in the direction of the race that they themselves are. Children 
may assume that because they like the race they themselves are then everyone else 
probably wants to be the same race, too. 
I believed it would be likely that children would remain consistent in their answers 
to the type of question asked (whether it is the target or the offspring). Contrary to 
my prediction, however, the analysis revealed a main effect of question type. 
Children had higher scores for the target stimuli than for the offspring, indicating that 
they were more likely to accept changes to the target than to the offspring and 
presenting the possibility of a latent understanding of inheritance. The children may 
have understood the implications of racial constancy and the process of inheritance, 
but their responses were swayed by the salience of the pictorial evidence of the 
changes. The evidence that a target person looked one way, went to the doctor, and 
now looks like a different race could have been compelling enough to bypass the 
inchoate theories of inheritance and racial constancy. This latent knowledge of 
inheritance could have been swayed by the pictorial evidence of the target changing 
appearance, but could have resurfaced when the offspring's racial categorization was 
queried. Put more simply, the children could have been willing to accept a superficial 
change in appearance as a de facto change of racial category for a given person. 
However, because of the awareness of the implication of inheritance, the original 
racial characteristics may have been viewed as being transmitted to the stimulus 
person's offspring despite apparent changes to the stimulus person's racial category. 
Appendix D contains selected transcriptions that present children's explanations of 
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why they believe that the offspring did not change racial categories even though the 
target stimulus did. Some children were very clear and consistent in their 
understanding and explanation of this concept (see Appendix D, Participant 29). 
Other children had a vague understanding that was not consistently applied (see 
Appendix D, Participant 32). 
So, in light of the findings presented here, how do children view race? Do young 
children possess a conceptual, adult-like theory of race? Do very young children 
essentialize race as Hirschfeld (1995) suggests? Or is an adult-like theory of race a 
gradual development as others suggest (Aboud, 1987; Aboud, 1988; Semaj, 1980)? 
The chi square analyses show clearly that preschool children treated race in the same 
way that they treated animals and artifacts. Preschool children accepted a change in 
racial category as easily as they accepted a coffeepot turning into a birdfeeder. Thus, 
it does not appear that young children are essentializing race with the adult-like 
understanding that Hirschfeld believes that they have. Second grade students did not 
treat animals any differently than they treated artifact changes, but they did appear to 
be essentializing race to some extent and treated race as different from artifacts. 
Fourth graders essentialized both animals and race, but did not essentialize artifacts. 
Fourth graders did not essentialize race with the near unanimity that adults do 
(Madole et al., 1999), but more fourth graders essentialized race than did 2nd graders, 
and more 2nd graders essentialized race than did preschool children. Children showed 
a clear developmental trend toward essentialization of race, from no essentializing at 
a young age, to some essentialization in elementary school, to nearly unanimous 
essentializing of race in adulthood. 
It appears, then, that children are following a development trend toward 
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essentializing that begins sometime after preschool and matures fully sometime after 
4th grade. What is this transformation that is occurring? Is there a sudden, qualitative 
change in how children categorize as some believe (Hirschfeld, 1994, 1995; Keil, 
1989; Mandler, 1993), or, as others maintain, is there a gradual, quantitative change 
in children's knowledge that leads to this shift in thinking (Madole & Oakes, 1999)? 
I believe that there is a gradual, quantitative change in the information that a child 
possesses. Some of the children in the 2nd and 4th grade age groups possess pieces of 
information that change how they think about racial transformations. Some of these 
children have not yet encountered the information they need or, if they possess it, 
have not yet learned to apply it to this kind of situation. This information may or may 
not be knowledge of inheritance; more exploration needs to be done. It makes sense, 
however, that as information becomes available children learn to apply it to various 
situations, including racial categorization. Some children may, either through 
happenstance or differences in environment, acquire knowledge at different points in 
development, and changes to view of racial categorization follow. 
So, to summarize, the evidence presented here showed that older children 
essentialized race more than did younger children, though not with the unanimity that 
Madole et al. (1999) found with adults. There was a developmental progression in 
children's essentializing of race, from virtually no essentializing in preschool, to 
approximately one third of 4th grade students essentializing race. Inheritance did not 
play a significant role in children's treatment of race. It is unclear from this study 
whether inheritance is not a piece of knowledge that factors into children's 
development of an adult-like theory of race, or if I simply did not manipulate 
inheritance in the right manner. Follow up studies need to be done to clarify the role, 
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or lack of role, that inheritance plays in children's understanding of race. 
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Appendix A 
Stories and Stimulus Pictures 
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When this animal was born, it did things that rabbits usually do. Here are pictures of 
this animal's mommy and daddy. Here is a picture of the animal when it grew up. 
One day the animal got sick, so the vet gave it some medicine. But the medicine was 
too strong, and the little animal lost its long ears. It grew a bushy tail and behaved 
like a squirrel. The animal could not be changed to be the way it was before. Here is 
a picture of what the animal now. What is this animal? Is this animal still a rabbit, or 
is it now a squirrel? If this animal had babies, what would its babies be? 
When Sally was little, she did the things that young white girls usually do and looked 
like most white people. Here are some pictures of Sally's mommy and daddy. Here 
is a picture of Sally when she grew up. One day Sally went to the doctor, who 
changed the way Sally looks. Her skin was made to be darker and her face and hair 
were changed. None of what the doctor did could be changed back again. Here is a 
picture of Sally now. What is Sally? Is Sally still a white person, or is she now a 
black person? If Sally had babies, what would they be? 
When Bruce was little, he did the things that young white boys usually do and looked 
like most white people. Here are some pictures of Bruce's mommy and daddy. Here 
is a picture of Bruce when he grew up. One day Bruce went to the doctor, who 
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changed the way Bruce looks. His skin was made to be darker and his face and hair 
were changed. None of what the doctor did could be changed back again. Here is a 
picture of Bruce now. What is Bruce? Is Bruce still a white person, or is he now a 
black person? If Bruce had children, what would his children be? 
When Bob was little, he did things that people with long hair do. He brushed his hair 
and pulled it back in a ponytail. Here are pictures of Bob's mommy and daddy. Here 
is a picture of Bob when he grew up. One day Bob went to the barbershop to have his 
hair cut, and the barber cut off almost all of Bob's hair and made it so it could never 
grow long again. Here is a picture of Bob now. What is Bob, a long haired person or 
a short haired person? If Bob had children, what would his children be? 
When Sharon was little, she did the things that young black girls usually do and 
looked like most black people. Here are some pictures of Sharon's mommy and 
daddy. Here is picture of Bob when he grew up. One day Sharon went to the doctor, 
who changed the way Sharon looks. Her skin was made to be lighter and her face and 
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hair were changed. None of what the doctor did could be changed back again. Here 
is picture of Sharon now. What is Sharon? Is Sharon still a black person, or is she 
now a white person? If Sharon had babies, what would her babies be? 
When Billy was little, he did the things that young black boys usually do and looked 
like most black people. Here are some pictures of Billy's mommy and daddy. Here 
is a picture of Billy when he grew up. One day Billy went to the doctor, who changed 
the way Billy looks. His skin was made to be lighter and his face and hair were 
changed. None of what the doctor did could be changed back again. Here is a picture 
of Billy now. What is Billy? Is Billy still a black person, or is he now a white 
person? If Billy had babies, what would his babies be? 
When this thing was made, it was used to pour out coffee. Here are some other things 
made in the same factory. This is a picture of this thing when it was made. Then 
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some people took it. They took some pieces off of it, made some other changes, and 
filled it with seeds. None of what they did to it could be changed back again. After 
they did all of this, they used it to feed birds. Here is a picture of this thing now. 
What is this thing? Is it still a coffeepot, or is it now a birdfeeder? 
Appendix B 
Informed Consent and Child Assent Documents 
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
Dear Parent/Guardian: 
Your child is invited to participate in a study of children's understanding of 
how animals, objects, and people can change. The aim of our study is to better 
understand how children think about people, and especially about race. This study is 
being conducted by Dr. Kelly Madole and Jason Glerum of Western Kentucky 
University in cooperation with your child's school. The project will be conducted in 
one short session at your child's school, in cooperation with your child's teacher. We 
will coordinate the session with your child's teacher so that your child does not miss 
any important learning activities. 
The session will take about 15 minutes; your child will be interviewed 
individually. If you agree to allow your child to take part in this research, your child 
will be read eight brief stories describing animals, objects, or people undergoing some 
changes. The changes to people involve a change in the individual's race (from 
black to white or from white to black). After being read each story, your child will be 
asked to decide whether the object, animal or person has really changed. Responses 
may be tape recorded to ensure that all information is collected accurately. The tape 
recordings will be accessible only to the researchers and will be destroyed after the 
information is transcribed. 
We emphasize that your child's participation is entirely voluntary. If you or 
your child decides not to participate, it will have no negative outcome for you or your 
child in any way. Your child may refuse to answer any question and may withdraw 
from the study at any time. Individual participants' responses will be kept 
anonymous. The results may be part of a published research project in which all 
results would be reported in terms of group averages, and no children will ever be 
identified by name. If you wish, group information will be available in a written 
report of the results. 
The procedures in this study have been reviewed and approved by the Western 
Kentucky University Committee for the Protection for Human Research Participants. 
The University has filed a form called "Assurance of Compliance with DHHD 
regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects" with the Department of Health and 
Human Services. 
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Specific questions about this study may be directed to Dr. Kelly Madole, 
Research Director for this project at (270) 745-6475. We urge you to phone if you 
have any questions. We will be happy to hear from you. 
We hope that you will allow your child to take part in our study. We promise 
to make it a pleasant experience and to schedule our sessions in cooperation with your 
child's teacher. Please fill in your child's name, your child's, date of birth, and 
teacher's name below. To indicate your consent, sign your name, and fill in the date 
below. When your child returns this letter to the teacher, whether you say yes or no, 
your child will receive a Western Kentucky University "Big Red" pencil. 
Thank you for your help. 
Sincerely, 
Kelly Madole, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor 
Jason Glerum 
Graduate Student 
Western Kentucky University 
Parental Consent Form 
Child's name: Date of Birth: 
Teacher's name: 
No. I do not give my consent for my child to participate in this study. 
Yes. I have read the information provided about this study, and give my 
consent for my child to participate in the individual interview that is part of the study 
conducted by Dr. Kelly Madole and Jason Glerum of Western Kentucky University. 
I understand that although my child may be tape recorded, anonymity and security of 
data will be maintained. I also understand that I may withdraw my child from the 
study at any time without penalty. 
Parent/Guardian 
signature: Date: 
46 
CHILD/MINOR ASSENT FORM 
I, understand that my parents (mom and 
dad) have said it's okay for me to take part in a project about how things can change 
under the direction of Kelly Madole and Jason Glerum. 
I am taking part because I want to. I know that I will be tape recorded but that only 
the people working with Kelly and Jason will be able to hear the tape. I have been 
told that I can stop any time I want to and nothing will happen to me if I want to stop. 
Signature 
Appendix C 
Orders for Stimulus Presentation 
Order One 
Animal transformation 
White to Black Female transformation 
White to Black Male transformation 
Long Hair to Short Hair transformation 
Black to White Female transformation 
Black to White Male transformation 
Coffeepot to Birdfeeder transformation 
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Order Two 
Artifact transformation 
Male Black to White transformation 
Female Black to White transformation 
Long Hair to Short Hair transformation 
Male White to Black transformation 
Female White to Black transformation 
Animal transformation 
Appendix D 
Selected Transcriptions 
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1. Participant 29: Male 8y/o Caucasian: Inheritance, Order 2, Set 2 
Examiner: Female black to white race change story (...is she still a black person?) 
Child: Uhn-uh. Shaking head 
Examiner: She's now a white person? 
Child: Mm-hmm. Nodding. 
Examiner: Okay, what would her babies be if she had babies? 
Child: White. 
Examiner: White? Why do you think they would be white? 
Child: Well, I think they'd be black, really, because it's not changing everything in 
your body. It's not changing every kind of part in your body. Because whatever 
makes the baby, it's probably gonna ... probably, probably born to be black but you 
got your skin changed so it would still probably be black, because that's just you 
that'd be white. 
Examiner: Okay. So, you think that she would be white, but the babies would be 
black? 
Child: nod 
Examiner: Yeah? Why do you think that she would be whi... 
Child: Sort of tan. 
Examiner: Sort of tan? Why do you think that Sally would be white? 
Child: Because she got her, umm.., her skin changed. 
Examiner: Okay, but that doesn't mean that her babies' skin would be changed? 
Child: Shaking head. 
Examiner: No? Okay. 
Child: Cuz you didn't change the babies. 
Examiner: Male white to black race change story. 
Child: A black person. 
Examiner: What would his babies be? 
Child: White...? 
Examiner: Why do you think they'd be white? 
Child: long pause 
Examiner: Same reason as before? 
Child: Yeah. 
Examiner: Which was what? 
Child: Cuz they didn't change, you know, the parts his body and stuff and then like, 
whatever makes the babies, it would probably like, it ain't changing that, it's just 
changing him. 
Examiner: Okay, so there are parts of your body other than your skin that makes you 
black or white? 
Child: nod. Mm-hmm. 
2. Participant 32: Female 7y/o African-American: Inheritance, Order 1, Set 2 
Examiner: Female white to black race change story 
Child: Um, a black person. 
Examiner: If she had babies, what would her babies be? 
Child: Uh...white. 
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Examiner: They'd be white? 
Child: nod 
Examiner: Why do you think her babies would be white? 
Child: Because that's her body. 
Examiner: What do you mean by that? 
Child: Like.. .under the skin that the doctor did, it's really white. 
Examiner: So the doctor just changed the skin... 
Child: Uh-huh. 
Examiner: ...but underneath the skin there is still something else? 
Child: nod 
Examiner: Okay. What else is it, do you think? What is it that didn't change? 
Child: Her heart, and other parts of her body. 
Examiner: Female black to white race change story. 
Child: Uh, white. 
Examiner: If she had babies, what would her babies be? Black babies, or white 
babies? 
Child: Uhh... probably white. 
Examiner: Why do you think they would be white? 
Child: Because she's a white person now, and she's.. .gonna have white babies. 
